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Trade Unions and Productivity:
Some New Evidence on an Old Issue
ABSTRACT
This paper summarized some new evidence concerning the impact of
collective bargaining on productivity for workers of a given quality
working with the same amount of capital. The new findings, which are
based on econometric investigations, indicate that inmany sectors,
in particular manufacturing and construction, unionized work places are
on average more productive than those that are nonunion. This positive
union productivity effect is not an immutable constant. For example,
in the underground bituminous coal industry, unionized mines were
significantly less productive than nonunion mines in 1975 althougl-i they
were significantly more productive in 1965.
The routes by which unions affect productivity have not yet
been carefully delineated, and they appear to differ from sector to sector.
In manufacturing, reduced turnover and improved management seem to be
key; in construction, better trained workers and more rationalized
hiring and supervision seem to be primary.
Finally, while the union/nonunion productivity differential is likely
to be positive, it is on average not large enough to offset the
greater compensation and capital intensity under unionism. Hence,
higherproductivity and lower profitability appear to go hand in hand
under collective bargaining.
Richard B. Freeman James L. Medoff National Bureau of Department of Economics EconomicResearch
Harvard University
1050 Massachusetts Ave. Littauer Center 115
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 021381
The impact of trade unionism on productivity has long been one of the
major bones of contention among analysts of unionism. As Derek Bok and John
Dunlop wrote in 1970: "For more than a century and a half, economists have
debated the effects of 'combinations of workmen,' or collective bargaining, on
the efficiency of business enterprises. The literature is replete with
conflicting appraisals of the impact of work stoppages, work rules, regulation
of machinery, apprenticeship, and training on employee efficiency and
managerial decisions."1
Do unions decrease or increase labor productivity? According to standard
economic theory, unions raise wages and management responds by increasing the
capital intensity of its work place and the "quality" of its work force, which
increases the productivity of labor. This "productivity effect" of unions is
accepted by most discussants of the issue at hand. The real controversy
arises when the question becomes: Controlling for differences both in the
amount of capital labor has to work with and in labor quality, is productivity
higher or lower in workplaces which are unionized? Thatis,if we compare
union and nonunion workplaces whichareidentical interms of theirproductive
inputs, does collective bargaining lead to human resources practices which
increase or decrease productivity?
This paper summarizes some new evidence concerning the latter question of
workers of the same skill and using the same capital. The first section lays
Out two opposing views of the issues: one which focuses on "the union wage
(or more accurately, wages plus fringes) effect" and management responses to
it, and one which focuses on the non—wage effects of unionism. Section II
describes how a standard tool of economic theory and econometrics ——the2
production function ——hasbeen used to help analyse the question while
section III summarizes the results of the production function investigations.
In the fourth section we turn from the level of productivity to its growth.
The evidence presented indicates that whatever unions do, they are not
preventing firms either from adopting new technologies, or from taking the
other steps which cause productivity to grow. In the fifth section we take a
glimpse inside the black box which links trade unions and productivity. While
we cannot identify all of the factors at work, we can offer evidence on some
important ones.
I. "Monopoly" and "Voice/Response" Effects
We have argued elsewhere that unions have two types of effects:
"monopoly" effects and "voice/response" effects.2 The monopoly effects deal
with unions' impact on the level of employee compensation (wages plus
fringes), and the ramifications of union—induced changes in that level; the
voice/response effects deal with what unions do once their monopoly effects
have been netted out (see Figure 1). According to the monopoly model, firms
respond to unionism by altering capital (and other inputs) per worker and
improving the quality of labor until the contribution of the last unit of
labor just equals the union wage rate. While under some circumstances unions
may use their monopoly power to lower productivity throughrestrictive work
practices, competition in product markets is unlikely to permit such practices
for very long except in markets sheltered from competition. An employer who
pays a higher cost of labor and gets less rather than more productivityout of































































































































































































































































































While the monopoly model predicts that unionized firms will have higher
productivity than otherwise comparable nonunion firms, it is important to
realize that the monopoly—wage induced gain in productivity is socially
harmful. In the absence of other interferences with perfect competition, the
wage effect causes labor and capital to be allocated in such a way that their
contribution to national output is not as high as it would be if competitive
market prices determined where these factors were being utilized. Workers who
would have been employed in the union sector are forced to take lower
productivity jobs in the nonunion sector. Machines that would have been
employed in nonunion enterprises are now used in the union sector to raise the
productivity of unionized labor. And the size of the union sector is smaller
than it would have been in the absence of union monopoly wages. The social
cost of union monopoly wage gains can be interpreted as an estimate of the
lost productivity due to the set of monopoly effects associated with unionism.
The voice/response routes by which collective bargaining raises
productivity are, by contrast, potentially socially desirable, since they
result not from inefficient allocation of resources but from improved
efficiency within firms. For example, reductions in turnover due to unionism
raise productivity by lowering costs of training and recruitment.3 In
industries like construction productivity gains result from unionized
apprenticeship programs that produce better workers. Managerial responses to
unionism that take the form of more rational personnel policies and more
careful monitoring of work activity raise productivity by reducing
organizational slack. The voluminous case studies by Harvard Business
School's Sumner Slichter, James Healy, and Robert Livernash and by other5
researchers have shown the effectiveness of the managerial response to
unionism is perhaps the most important determinant of what unions do to
productivity. Some managements will adjust to the union and turn unionism
into a positive force at the workplace; others will not. Over the long run,
those that respond positively will prosper while those that do not will suffer
in the market.4
Just as the monopoly analysis allows for the possibility that restrictive
work rules reduce productIvity, the voice/response analysis allows for the
possibility that some work rules, such as seniority or rules restricting
managerial flexibility, can reduce productivity. Perhaps most importantly,
the voice/response analysis points to the "state of industrial relations" in a
sector as a key factor in either raising or reducing productivity. If
industrial relations are good, with management and unions working together to
produce a bigger "pie" as well as fighting over the size of their slices,
productivity is likely to be higher under unionism. If Industrial relations
are poor, with management and labor Ignoring common goals to battle one
another, productivity Is likely to be lower under unionism.
The empirical question is whether productivity—augmenting or
productivity—reducing behavior dominates in the economy.
II. Union Productivity Effects: Theory and Evidence
The new tool used to study the impact of unionism on productivity is the
production function, which traditionally makes output per worker depend on
capital per worker, other inputs used per worker, and indicators of the
quality of the workers (as reflected in their level of schoolIng, for6
instance). To determine the effects of unionism on productivity, one adds to
the traditional variables a variable giving the fraction of the work force
that is unionized. In statistical analyses the estimated effect of the
fraction unionized reflects what unions do to productivity above and beyond
changes in the amount of physical inputs used per worker. To isolate the
union effect in this framework, one must have good measures of output,
capital, and the quality of labor, and one must specify properly the nature of
the production relation itself.
Table 1 summarizes the results of studies using the production function
technique on the relation between unionism and productivity. As the table
shows, the studies differ in their measures of labor productivity, with some
measuring it as dollars of value added (or shipments) per worker and others in
physical units (tons, square feet) per worker. Value added is a dollar
measure (price times quantity) that has the advantage of including the full
spectrum of goods produced by a firm, valued at their market prices. It also
has a disadvantage, however: unless the prices charged by union and nonunion
firms are the same, any finding of higher value added per worker in the
organized establishments could reflect not the higher physical output per
worker, but rather a higher price per unit of output. In industries where
markets are truly national, with a single price for each output, and where
unionized and nonunionized firms are equally likely to specialize in high—
priced or in low—priced outputs, the possible confusion of price with quantity
is small, but in industries where markets are partly local, it could lead to
misleading inferences. Physical measures of output alleviate this problem but7
Table 1
Productivity Function Estimates of the Union Productivity Effect
Estimated Difference
in Productivity (with
Amount of Capital per
Worker, Other Factors Studies Using Value Held Fixed) between Added or Shipments Union and Nonunion
(Sector, Unit of Comparison, Year) Units
1. Manufacturing Industries, States Percent
1972A 20 to 25; 10 to 15
1972B 10
1977 27
Changes between 1972 and 1977 9
2. Wooden Household Furniture, Plants, 1975—1976 15
3. Construction, (revenue Deflated by
Area Price Index, States, 1972—1975 19 to 25
4. Office Building Construction (revenue
Deflated by Area Price Index), General
Contractors, 1974 38
5. Manufacturing, Individual Businesses, 1980 —2
Studies of Physical Units of Output
(Sector, Unit of Comparison, Year)
6. Cement (Tons), Plants, 1974 6 to 8
7. Cement (changes in tons), Plants
that Went from Nonunion to Union, 1953—76 6
8. Underground Bituminous Coal (tons),
Mines 1965 25 to 30
1970 —10 to 5
1975 —25 to 20
1980 —15 to 20
9. Construction (Square Feet), Projects, 1974 32
SOURCES: (1) 1972A: C. Brown and J. Medoff, "Trade Unions in the
Production Process "Journalof Political Economy 86, no. 3 (June
1978: 355—78; 197B ano i911: tstimated With Jonathan Leonard from
data based on Census of Manufacturers. (2) J. Frantz, "The Impact
of Trade Unions on Productivity in the Wood Household Furniture
Industry" (Undergraduate thesis, Harvard University, 1976). (3) and
(9) S. Allen, "Unionized Construction Workers Are More Productive"
Carolina State University, 1981, mimeographed. (4) S. Allen,
'Unionization and Productivity in Office Building and School
Construction" (North Carolina State University, 1983, mimeographed),
27—30. (5) K. Clark, "Unionization and Firm Performanc: The Impact
on Profits, Growth and Productivity": National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 990 (1982). (6) and (7) K. Clark, "The
Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 34 (July 1980): 466. (8) M. onnerton, K. .rreeman,ana J. I... riedoff, "Industrial Relations and
Productivity: A Study of the U.S. Bituminous Coal Industry"
(Harvard University, 1983 revision, mimeographed).8
at the cost of being limited to the few distinct goods that can be so
measured. Most modern firms produce a wide variety of products with too many
dimensions to be captured by a single physical measure. Because neither
measure is perfect, researchers have analyzed both value—added and physical
measures of labor productivity.
The first study, by Professor Charles Brown of the University of Maryland
and James Medoff, compared value added per worker across states in the same
industry, and found that, with other factors (including capital per worker)
the same, productivity was 20 to 25 percent higher in the more heavily
unionized states. They also found, however, that unionized firms used more
capital per worker than predicted in the analysis, a fact that suggests that
they have not perfectly modelled the production process. Because the
estimated union effect depends critically on how capital affects output, they
report lower figures of 10 to 15 percent under various assumptions regarding
the productivity of capital. Follow—up work for manufacturing (the authors
and Professor Jonathan Leonard of the University of California, Berkeley) has
produced a smaller positive union productivity effect than Brown and Medoff
for 1972, using a different measure of capital, but a larger effect of 1977.
Analysis focused on a single manufacturing industry, wooden household furniture,
yielded an estimate of 15 percent higher productivity in union than in non-
union plants. In construction, Professor Steven Allen of North Carolina
State University has estimated union—nonunion productivity differences in
value added (deflated by an area price index, to deal with the danger that
in this sector the higher value added reflects higher prices of union built
buildings) ranging from 17 percent to 22 percent. Not all value9
added studies have, however, obtained positive union productivity effects. In
a study of productivity in businesses," defined as parts of certain large
firms that can be considered separate, Professor Kim Clark of the Harvard
Business School found a slight negative union impact. Clark's findings make
it clear that the production function technique can yield negative as well as
positive union impacts and that the union effect is likely to differ across
different parts of the economy ——apoint to which we will return later.
Analyses of physical productivity, summarized in the bottom half of the
table, have in two cases found positive union effects and in one case found an
effect that went from positive to negative over time. Clark estimated that
productivity in cement was 6 to 8 percent higher in organized than in
nonorganized plants in 1974. In construction, Allen obtained data from the
U.S. Department of Labor on 83 office building projects and found that,
measured by square feet constructed per worker, the union projects had 11
percent to 39 percent higher productivity. Consistent with Allen's finding of
higher productivity in union construction, two case studies that examined
labor usage in the bids of union and nonunion contractors for identical
buildings found that union contractors estimated a need for 20 to 25 percent
fewer workers for the project than were needed by nonunion contractors.5
Finally, our analysis (in conjunction with Marguerite Connerton of the U.S.
Department of Labor) of tons of coal produced in underground bituminous coal
mines (virtually all underground tonnage in the United States was captured)
yielded quite different results in different time periods: positive union
productivity effects in 1965, small positive to small negative effects in
1970, sizable negative effects in 1975, and smaller negative effects in 1980.10
The switch in the union effect from positive to negative shows that the union
productivity effect is highly variable over time, dependent on labor and
management policies and relations, which can improve or deteriorate.
Two of the studies in Table 1 used a before—after method of analysis,
examining the relation between changes In productivity and changes in
unionism. Both found productivity increasing with the advent of unionism. In
analysis of 1972—1977 changes in manufacturing productivity, we and Leonard
obtained a positive but statistically Insignificant union effect, which showed
that productivity did better in areas where unionism grew more (declined less)
but not by a well—defined magnitude. Clark compared productivity In six
cement plants that went union in the 1960s and found increases in productivity
of 6 to 8 percent.
While the bulk of the work has focused on the U.S., an analysis for
Japanese manufacturing yielded results comparable to those in the original
Brown—Medoff study. For 1973, Muramatsu found a positive but insignificant
union productivity effect of 5 percent in Japanese manufacturing. For 1977 we
found that the unionized parts of Japanese manufacturing had a 19 percent
productivity advantage. The difference in results between the years may be
due to data problems or to differences over time in the relevant set of
intervening union effects.
In sum, most studies of productivity find that unionized workplaces
are more productive than otherwise comparable nonunion workplaces. Because
unionized labor costs are also higher, however, one should not infer from this
that firms should be eager to be organized. Statistical evidence indicates
that the productivity increases cannot offset the greater capital intensity
and labor costs under unionism. Higher productivity does not mean a higher
rate of return on capital.6U
III. Unions and the Growth of Productivity
While unions may have a positive effect on productivity at a given point
in time, they may cause productivity to decline over time. This would happen
if unions prevented firms from adopting new technologies; it would also happen
if unions led to a retardation in the growth rate of capital.
Historically, some unions have opposed technological change. "The
Window—Glass Workers, with a strong craft tradition, tried to prevent the use
of glassworking machines when they were Introduced In 1908...In time, however,
the new processes displaced the old, since they were much more efficient, and
the window—glass union had to be formally disbanded in 1928. Other unions
have endorsed practices such as rigid piece rates which reduce the economic
benefits of technological change to employers."7
Because unions that oppose technological change tend to go out of
business, the general union attitude toward technological change is not one of
stubborn opposition. While not all unions encourage technological change to
the extent that John L. Lewis' Mine Workers did in the 1950s and 1960s (when
the UMW favored rapid mechanization of the mines, high productivity, and high
wages, at the expense of employment), many unions view change favorably ——as
long as they can protect their members against serious harm. In the 1980s, as
well as earlier, indeed, some unions have even pressed management to modernize
their plants with new investments, as they realize that failure to do so means
ultimate loss of jobs.8
Union policy toward technological change, whether pro or con, however, is
not the only determinant of the impact of organization on productivity growth.
Union wage increases may themselves speed up the rate of "technological12
advance by inducing management to substitute new machinery for labor or by
inducing management to pay for the development and introduction of new
technologies. On the other hand, however, high wages reduce profitability of
the union sector, discouraging further investments in the area.
To see unionism is positively or negatively related to the growth of
productivity, as opposed to the level of productivity, we have analyzed the
impact of the proportion of workers unionized on the rate of growth of value
added or value of shipments in three data sets. The results of our analysis,
which are summarized in Table 2, suggest that while highly unionization
industries have, indeed, had somewhat slower growth of productivity than low
unionized industries, the observed relation is too weak statistically to
support any conclusion that unionism reduces dynamic efficiency. Some highly
unionized industries have rapid productivity growth while others have less
rapid growth. Because unionized sectors tend to be "older" industries, one
expects some negative relation between productivity and unionism because of
the life cycle of industries (a new industry typically enjoys more rapid
productivity growth than an older established sector) even if unionism did
nothing harmful to the rate of industrial progress. Consistent with our
results, analysts of the relationship between productivity growth and research
and development spending that includes unionism as a "control variable" shows
no clear pattern, with negative relationships between the fraction organized
and growth of productivity in some periods and positive relationships in other
periods.9 On the other hand, a recent study by Hirsch and Link of the growth
of total factor productivity between 1957 and 1973 in 192—digit nonunionized
industries yielded a negative significant coefficient on both a unionism
variable and a change in unionism variable. Over all, current empirical
evidence offers no support for the bald assertion that unionization is
associated with lower (or higher) productivity advance but suggests the value
of further work.13
Table 2
Unionism and Growth of Productivity in Manufacturing
Estimated Effect of Unionism
Measure of Productivity, on Growth of Productivity per
Years Analyzed Worker per Year
1. Value Added per Worker Insignificant Negative
in 176 Industries, 1958—76 Effect of —.4 Percentage Points
LI4t h A(rrath ,f9 -(P r n
Points
2.Value of Shipment in 450 Insignificant Negative Union
Industries, per Unit of Labor Effect of —.3 Percentage Points
and Capital, 1958—78 with Average Growth of 0.7 Percentage
Points
3. Value Added per Production Insignificant Negative Union Effect of
Worker Hour, State by —.3 Percantage Points with Average
Industry Cells, 1972—77 Growth of 1.2 Percentage Points
SOURCES: (1) Calculations use the Annual Survey of Manufactures, conducted by
the U.S. Census Bureau, as described in R. B. Freeman, "Unionism,
Price—Cost Margins and the Return to Capital': National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 6642 (1983). (2) Calculated
with Wayne Gray, using shipments data from various volumes of the
Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the Census of Manufactures,
onducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. (For discussion of both of
these data sources, see Appendix.) (3) Calculated from 1972 and
1977 Census of Manufactures data. Value added deflated by GNP.14
The Recent Slowdown in Productivity Growth
The claim that productivity has historically grown more rapidly in
periods of lower organization of the workforce is simply false. The U.S.
economy has enjoyed rapid growth of productivity in periods of relativelyweak
unionization (the 1900s, for example) and rapid growth in periods of strong
unionization, notably the decades immediately following the Second World War.
While so much changes over time that it would be foolhardy to read any
causality into hIstorical associations, the fact is that in both the post—
World War II period and over a longer period stretching back to 1900, (war
years and the Great Depression years excluded) there is essentially no
connection between productivity growth in the United States and unionization.
In a year when unionization has been above average, rates of growth of
productivity have been above average, while in years when unionizationhas
been below average, so too have rates of growth of productivity (see Table 3).
While it is still possible that union—induced changes in the overall economy
are inimical to rapid productivity growth, the historical data do not show
such a pattern.
IV. A Glimpse Inside the Black Box
The impact of collective bargaining on productivity is not an immutable
constant. In fact, the impact appears to depend greatly on both the "internal
climate" of a workplace and the "external climate" in which management and
labor operate. We have seen that in many settings unions have a positive
impact on productivity, even after the "monopoly" effects of the institution
are netted out. Isn't this finding inconsistent with what managers sayunions15
Table 3
Productivity Growth and Unionization Over Time
1950—80
Rate of Change in Rate of Change in
Output per Worker Output per Worker
Above Median Below Median
Unionization




Rate of Change in Output Rate of Change in Output
per Worker Above Median per Worker Below Median
Unionization
Above Median 13 13
Unionization
Below Median 13 13
SOURCE:Calculated by computing median levels of unionization and rate of
change in output per worker in each period, and comparing
unionization and rate of change in output per worker to their medians.
Unionization figures are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Output per worker data are from U.S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor
Review, various editions, and from U.S. Department of Labor,
Historical Statistics of the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1957).16
do? What precisely are the channels through which unions affect productivity?
A black box which takes unionism and transforms it into greater productivity
net of capital intensity and labor quality would be much more credible if its
workings were understood.
Management Flexibility Under Unionism
That unions reduce managerial flexibility is one of the most frequent
charges brought against unions by managers. Jurisdictional limitations on
what workers can and cannot do; restrictions on the activity of foremen and
other nonunion workers to perform the work of members in the bargaining unit;
restrictions on contracting work out; insistence on operating by the rules
even when it may be more efficient to break them are all different ways in
which unions impair managerial flexibility.
To evaluate the impact of unionism on the flexibility of operations we
have examined the degree to which union and nonunion management substitute
nonproduction labor and capital for production labor when the relative costs
of the latter change. If unionism reduces flexibility, the extent of such
cost—minimizing substitution is likely to be less in a unionized setting. Our
analysis of substitutability between production and nonproduction labor among
industries and among plants within industries show that unionism is associated
with less substitutability between production and nonproduction labor but
not between production labor and capital. We estimate that a 10 percent
increase in the wage of production workers relative to the wage of
nonproduction workers causes a 1.9 percent substitution of nonproduction for17
production labor in a union setting compared to a 2.8 percent substitution in
a nonunion setting.11
Even substantial reductions in flexibility are, however, unlikely to have
a great effect on productivity. When production lines are machine—run,
flexibility is simply not important. When operations are more amenable to
managerial decisions, the good manager can substitute better advance planning
for flexibility. Perhaps most importantly, flexibility ——definedin terms of
the substitutability among inputs in a production function ——isa second
order rather than first order factor in affecting the level of productivity.''
In the construction industry, where complaints about restrictive union work
rules are commonplace, experts in the economics of the industry almost
uniformly agree that the rules' effect on productivity has been vastly
exaggerated: 12
"relatively few union workers are covered by contracts
of this nature"
...their (work rules) adverse effect is much less than
has been widely alleged"
"Although no reliable quantitative estimate can be made
of those rules on efficiency, their total impact would
appear to be very small"
"There is no question that at various times and places,
various locals of the building trades unions have resisted
technological innovation in tools or materials and have
established unduly restrictive work rules or practices.
Yet, the results of our survey, as of other field research,
do not support the contention that this has been a widespread
or consistent policy."
All told, reductions in flexibility, while irritating to management, have
only modest effects on productivity.18
Some Positive Channels
Suppose the reduction in productivity due to reduced management
flexibility has been oversold. In what ways does unionism in fact raise
productivity and by how much?
These are extremely difficult questions to answer, for they require
knowledge not only of differences in the characteristics of organized and
unorganized workplaces but also of the actual ways in which the workplaces operate.
Our current knowledge suggests that several factors underlie the union—
productivity linkage. In manufacturing, the fact that unions substantially
reduce quit rates appears to explain some of the union productivity effect.
Brown and Medoff estimated that one—fifth of the union/nonunion productivity
differential in the average manufacturing industry was attributable to the
lower turnover under unionism. Muramatsu found that all of the 1978 Japanese
union effect on productivity was to to lower quits. In construction, Allen
attributed 10 pe'cent of the union productivity advantage to the reduced need
for supervision under unionism; and 8 percent to the greater use of
standardized components by union contractors.13 In the cement industry, Clark
found some changes in worker behavior likely to raise productivity (lower
turnover in half of the plants studied, and, according to the union, improved
morale in two of six), but he found the most important changes in managerial
performance (Table 4). In every plant which became unionized, top management
replaced the plant manager and many foremen and introduced more professional
managerial practices, weeding out authoritarian or paternalistic practices.
Supervisors"tightened the ship," "kept a close eye on things," and introduced19
Table 4
Responses to Unionism in Six Cement Plants
Number of Plants with Changes
Worker Responses in Behavior
Turnover In three plants, turnover down.
In two plants, no change in turnover.
In one plant, turnover rises.
Absenteeism In two plants, absenteeism increases.
Discipline problems In one plant, discipline problems increase.
In one plant, discipline problems decrease.
Morale Union reports improvement in three plants;
management reports improvement in one, no
change in one, worse in one.
Management Responses
Plant Manager Six plants replace plant manager.
Supervisors Six plants replace supervisors.
Management Practices
Before Union One plant rated management practices
"professional." Three plants rated as
"authoritarian." One plant rated as
"authoritarian" or "paternalistic." One
plant rated as "paternalistic."
After Union Three plants report major improved methods
of management: productivity targeting;
performance review meetings; periodic
meetings with workers; introduction of
standards; new reporting and accounting
systems; better supervisor/worker
relations.
Two plants report minor improvements: more
formalized contract procedures; changes in
way supervisors deal with people; gradual
changes in system of monitoring
performance.
One plant reports little change: only
difference is in supervisor/worker
relations.
SOURCE:K. Clark, 'The Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case
Study," Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July 1980): 451—68.20
new modes of operation likely to raise productivity. This finding gains
credence from the fact that it is similar to the central conclusion of
Slichter, Healy, and Livernash in The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Management that •The challenge that unions present management has, if viewed
broadly, created superior and better balanced management, 'even though some
exceptions must be recognized."14
In some industries productivity is advanced by explicit labor—management
cooperative ventures. In the men's tailored clothing industry, for example,
labor and management established a committee to develop and introduce
automatic sewing machines to enable U.S. workers and firms to compete with low
wage foreign competitors, hiring Draper Laboratories, formerly a part of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to do the technical work. According to
John T. Dunlop,
The program has several distinct features. The Department
of Commerce is contributing financially, although no more
than the private—sector contributions from labor and
management. The managements and the union in the clothing
industry have been joined by two leading textile manu-
facturers and a leading synthetic yarn company to constitute
a broad sectoral group to improve coordination and produc-
tivity improvements. These joint responses of labor and
management e beyond those that could be achieved at the
work place.
While joint efforts are relatively uncommon, increased pressures from
foreign competitors may induce other industries and unions to engage in
similar cooperative activities in the future.21
V. The Union Productivity Effect Across Climates
The effect of collective bargaining on productivity is not an immutable
constant. In fact, the new literature on the union productivity effect
indicates that the effect varies widely across settings. Is this variation
systematic? In which climates will the positive effects of unionism flourish?
An Important implication of the voice—response model Is that productivity
is likely to depend on the state of labor—management relations in shops. When
those relations are poor, management is likely to have trouble getting high
productivity. When they are good, workers and management may pull together
for the benefit of the firm. Three studies have examined the link between
productivity and the state of industrial relations at a plant and all three have
found strong support for this proposition. In an analysis of productivity at
18 General Motors plants Professors Harry Katz and Thomas Kochan of M.I.T. and
Kenneth R. Gobeille found higher productivity where plant managers rated the
industrial relations climate good or where the rate of grievances filed by
workers was low (indicated that workers viewed the state of labor—management
relations as good). In a detailed study of paper mills, Bernard Ichniowski of
the National Bureau of Economic Research obtained similar results: a plant
with a low rate of grievances filed in a given period had notably better
productivity than the same plant when it had a high rate of grievances filed
(see Figure 2). In addition, he has estimated that low grievance plants have
correspondingly higher profits, because of the better procbuctivity, by as much
as a third compared with high grievance plants. In the third study, Professor
Michael Schuster of Syracuse University examined productivity at nine
manufacturing plants over a period of five years, during which a cooperative
union management program was introduced. He found an increase in productivity
in six of the eight plants for which productivity could be measured.'6Figure 2





































SOURCES: Automobiles, graph drawn with data found in Harry Katz, Thomas Kochan,
and Kenneth Gobeille "Industrial Relations Performance, Economic
Performance and the Effects of Quality of Working Life Effects: An
Inter—Plant Analysis" (MIT, Sloan School Working Paper 1329—82, July
1982).
Paper mills graph drawn with data found in Bernard Ichniowski, "How
Do Labor Relations Matter? A Study of Productivity in Eleven Paper
Mills" (NBER, 1983), table 8—2 and from his computer printouts.
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The striking change in the union effect in the coal industry from
positive in the 1960s to negative in the 1970s shown in Figure 3 appears to be
at least partially due to a deterioration in the state of industrial relations
in the sector. In the 1950s, when John L. Lewis ran the United Mine Workers
of America (LJMW) the union was a strong, centralized organization
(dictatorial, in many respects), whose policy was to favor mechanization,
rapid technological change and rising wages at the expense of employment. The
result, as can be seen in Figure 3, was extremely rapid productivity growth.
After Lewis' death, however, the union was wracked with internal dissent, as
one leader replaced another while workers engaged in wildcat strikes to voice
their complaints about work conditions. One union president, Tony Boyle, was
convicted of hiring gunmen to murder an insurgent leader. His successor,
Arnold Miller, was widely criticized as ineffective, and the next leader, Sam
Church, was turned out of office for failing to represent member's desires.
Instability in underground coal mining reached such a state that in 1976 there
were 1,383 work stoppages ——overten times the number fifteen years earlier —
— and3.5 percent of total working time was lost due to wildcat strikes, over
fifteen times as much as in 1961. Sensing the weakness of the union, some
coal managements sought to take advantage of the situation, delaying
settlement of grievances, and giving the union as much trouble as they
could.'7 While other factors, such as the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1972,
contributed to the reduction of productivity, the deterioration in industrial
relations in the sector is, in our view and that of many industry
participants, a major cause of the observed decline. Indeed, as the union








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lesson is that unionism per se is neither a plus nor a minus to productivity.
What matters is how unions and management interact at the workplace.
The External Climate
If industrial relations in coal could deteriorate to such an extent that
unionized mines became markedly less productive than nonunion mines, what
prevents conditions from deteriorating elsewhere in the organized part of the
economy, with commensurate adverse effecis c'n productivity? Why does coal in
the 1970s appear to be the exception, rather than therule?
We believe the answer lies with the extent of competition found in the
product market for the output produced by unionized labor. Like everyone
else, unions, management of organized plants, and covered workers are morelikely to
devoteeffort to productivity—augmenting activities when they face the gun of
competition. Indeed, in a competitive sector, only the unions and management
that are able to raise productivity to offset union wage gains will survive in
the long run. Sectors which are sheltered from competition, by contrast, may
or may not adopt productivity—improving activities. From this perspective the
collapse of productivity in unionized coal is understandable. Coal is a
natural resource that can be produced only in certain areas, so that the entry
of competitors is limited. In the 1970s, the price of coal soared because of
the shift in demand from oil to coal, allowing the organized mines to earn
reasonable returns and stay in business despite their higher labor costs per
unit of output. In 1975, when the estimated union productivity effect was
very sizably negative, and when average productivity in underground mining was
40 percent lower than in the 1969 peak year, the rate of return on investment26
in the entire industry was over four times what it had been in 1969. Of
course, the unionized producers suffered a serious loss of market share, from
about 70 percent of production in the late 1960s to 44 percent of production
in 1980. But they still remained in business.'8
It also appears that the union productivity effect appears to be greatest
where product markets are most competitive, a pattern pointed out by Addison
and Hirsch.'9 They noted that Clark in his study of the cement industry found
the largest union effect in the Southwest where nonunion competition was
greatest and that Mandelstamm's20 case studies of the residential construction
sector identified competition from contractors in Detroit as a key determinant
of the high level of productivity in heavily unionized Ann Arbor.
Conclusion
What unions do to productivity is one of the key factors in assessing the
overall economic impact of unions. The new quantitative studies indicate that
productivity is generally higher in unionized establishments than in otherwise
comparable establishments that are nonunion, but that the relationship is far
from immutable and has notable exceptions. Higher productivity appears to run
hand in hand with good industrial relations and to be spurred by competition
in the product market, while lower productivity under unionism appears to
exist under the opposite circumstances.27
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